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Suppose we have n men and n women. Each of the 2n people has a linear 
preference ordering on those of the opposite sex. We are interested in 
matchings to form n couples. A matching is stable if we cannot find a 
woman in one couple and a man in another who would prefer each other to 
their present partners. 
Stable matchings were first defined by Gale and Shapley [I], who showed 
that for any preference orderings a stable matching always exists. In general, 
there will be several stable matchings. For example, if all the men happen to 
have different first preferences, giving each man his first choice will be 
stable, regardless of the women’s preferences. Similarly, giving each woman 
her first choice (if possible) will be stable. 
Conway [2, p. 87-921 defines a partial ordering on the set of stable 
matchings as follows: one matching is > another if every man is at least as 
happy with his partner in the first matching as with his partner in the second. 
He shows that the set of stable matchings is always a finite distributive 
lattice. Knuth [2, p. 921 asks whether every finite distributive lattice can 
occur as the set of stable matchings generated by some set of men and 
women. We show this is the case. 
We will require a preliminary lemma about finite distributive lattices. If L 
is such a lattice and x E L we define a new lattice Lx by making a copy of 
all the elements ,Or and putting the copies immediately below the originals. 
More formally, if Y is disjoint from L with one element v,, E V for each 
y < x, then L” is the partial ordering on L U V given by (i) if w, z E L then 
w>z in Lx iff w>z in L; (ii) if wEL and u,E V, then w>u, in Lx iff 
w  > z in L; (iii) v, > v, iff w  > z; (iv) vw 3 z for any w, z. 
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LEMMA 1. If a set S of lattices includes a one-element lattice and 
includes a lattice isomorphic to L” for every L E S, x E L then every finite 
distributive lattice is isomorphic to a lattice in S. 
Proof Let M be a finite distributive lattice. We argue by induction on 
the size of M. If M has one element the result is immediate. Otherwise let z 
be the smallest member of M which is not the meet of two members different 
from z. Let w  be the meet of all members >z. N = { y 1 y 4 z} is a distributive 
sublattice in which meets and joins are preserved. It can be shown that if 
y < z then y = z A u for some u E N. Moreover, if u, A z = u2 A z # z then 
u, A w  = uZ A w. Hence the mapping from u to z A u is an isomorphism 
from (u ( u < w  and u 4 z) to (u j I( <z}. Therefore it4 is isomorphic to N”. 
By induction hypothesis, N is isomorphic to a lattice in S, so M is 
isomorphic to a lattice in S. Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 2. If we have n men and n women for whom the set of stable 
matchings is L, and x E L, then there are 2n men and 2n women with 
preferences such that the set of stable matchings is Lx. 
Proof Let L be the set of stable matchings possible for women w, ,..., w, 
and men m, ,..., m,. Let x denote the matching in which mi gets wi for all i 
and assume this is stable, i.e., a member of L. Then we will show the set of 
stable matchings for the 2n men m ,,..., m,; ml ,..., rn; and women wi ,..., wn; 
wi,..., wk with the following preferences is isomorphic to L”: 
mi: Use the original preferences of mi in the n-couple situation for all 
women strictly preferred to (above) wi. Replace wi by WI. After w; put wi+ , 
and finish the ordering arbitrarily. 
m;: First choice w;, followed by w, and the original preferences of mi 
below wi. Finish arbitrarily. 
wi: In the original preference ordering put rnj directly below mj for all 
j. For example, if m, is first choice and m3 second in the n-couple situation, 
then the new ordering is m,m;m, m;. 
wf: First choice is m,-,. Second choice is mi, followed by m;. Finish 
arbitrarily. 
In this definition all arithmetic is modulo n. We illustrate with an example 
after the proof. 
Proof: We begin by observing that in any stable 2n-couple matching 
with these preferences: (1) If for some i, m, gets wi+ i then w; (preferred by 
mi) must get ml-, , hence mt must get w;+ i for all i. (2) wf is the first choice 
of mf, hence w; must get either m,-, (and (1) applies), or mi, or m;. (3) mi 
must get somebody at least as good as wf+ i. (4) If mi does not get wf or 
&,I, then m; gets wf. (5)If m, prefers W, to w;, m; does not get Wj. (Wj 
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prefers m, to m;. If mf got wj, (4) would imply mi gets w! or wi,, so mi and 
wj would be happier together.) 
These observations imply that nobody gets assigned to the arbitrary part 
of his or her ordering. Further if we are given a stable matching for the 2n 
couples we obtain a stable matching for the n-couple problem (i.e., a member 
of L) by giving each wi her partner in the 2n-couple problem, deleting primes 
where necessary. Conversely if y E L, there is a corresponding stable 
matching for the 2n-couple situation in which mi is replaced by ml iff mi gets 
wi or somebody worse in y. If y < x there are two 2n-couple matches 
corresponding to y-one in which each mI gets w;, and one in which each mi 
gets wf+ 1. Those matches in which each m, gets ml+, correspond to V in the 
definition of Lx. Q.E.D. 
The construction in Lemma 2 also works when x is a matching that is not 
stable. We have not considered the implications of this. 
EXAMPLE. The eight people with preferences given below have stable 
matching corresponding to a 4-element lattice: (A) m, gets w2, m2 gets wl, 
m3 gets wl, m, gets w, (abbreviated (2134)) (B) (1243) (C) (1234) 
(D) (2143). (A) is the maximal element of L, (B) minimal. 
m, m2 m3 m4 Wl w2 w3 w4 
w2 Wl w3 w4 ml m2 m4 m3 
Wl w2 w4 w3 m2 ml m3 m4 (. . . = arbitrary) 
. . . . . . 
L’1234’ is a 6-element lattice generated by the preferences: 
m, m2 m3 m4 m; ml m; m; WI w, w3 w4 w; w; w; w; 
w2 WI w; w; w; w; w; w; ml m2 m4 m3 m4 ml m2 m3 
w; w; w; w; WI w2 w3 w, ml m; m; m; m, m2 m3 m4 
w; w; w4 w3 m2 m, m3 m4 ml rn; rn$ m; 
. . . rn; m; m; m; 
. . . 
The stable matchings are (213’4’1’2’34), (1’2’3’4’1234), (1’2’3’4’1243), 
(213’4’1’2’43), (2’3’4’1’1234), and (2’3’4’1’1243). The last two are 
members of V. 
The result announced in the title follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 
2. Examination of the proofs yields 
THEOREM. If L is a finite distributive lattice with n elements there are 
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sets of men and women such that the lattice of their stable matchings is 
isomorphic to L. The number of men (= number of women) is <2”. 
The construction we have given does not use the smallest number of 
people needed to represent a given lattice. The 6-element lattice in the 
example can be represented using ten people as follows 
ml m2 3 m4 m5 WI w2 w3 w4 ws 
wi w2 w3 w4 w5 m2 m3 ml m5 m4 
w3 w3 w2 ws w4 ml m2 m2 m4 m5 
Wl m3 
The stable matches are (12345), (12354), (13245), (13254), (31245), and 
(31254). However, it is not possible in general to go from L to Lx by adding 
only one additional couple. 
The structure of the set of matches is clearly reminiscent of the represen- 
tation of a permutation by cycles. I wish to thank Alvin Roth, whose recent 
work [3] motivated this note. 
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